Baath Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad in the late 1960s
apparently now “favored…a bigger role for the private sector” in Syria,
“looser” Syrian “links with the Eastern bloc and closer ties with the wealthy
Arab Gulf states and the West,” according to Alan George’s Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom.
So “after the disastrous Syrian defeat in the June 1967 war
with Israel”--in which Syria’s Golan Heights region was occupied by Israeli
government troops—“Assad and Jadid were at odds,” according to the same book; and
“on Feb. 25, 1969…armored forces under Hafez al-Assad’s command occupied
strategic posts, including media establishments in Damascus.”.
In response to the way Hafez al-Assad had used the Syrian
troops under his command in February 1969, the Baath Party’s National Congress
then passed a resolution in early November 1970 “stripping” Hafez al-Assad “of
his defense portfolio,” according to Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom.
But in reaction to this Baath National Congress resolution, according to the
same book, “Assad did not delay;” and “on the night of Nov. 12-13 [1970] his
men arrested Jadid and his closest associates” and established the third Baath
“corrective movement” military coup regime of Hafez al-Assad.
According to Patrick Seale’s preface to Contemporary Syria:
Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, “on wresting power from
his more radical comrade Salah Jadid, [Hafez] Assad immediately set about
cautiously reassuring and encouraging the business community” in Syria. And,
according to Nabil Sukkar’s essay, “The Crisis of 1986 and Syria’s Plan for
Reform,” that appears in the same book, Assad’s “takeover was warmly welcomed
by the upper strata of” Syrian “society and the largest part of the” [Syrian
“armed forces.” In addition, when {Hafez] Assad “took power in 1970 he…rolled
back many of the most radical “Baath regime “programs, such as the…land reform
policies,” according to The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs To
Know by James Gelvin.
Then, “4 months after his putsch,” Hafez “Assad appointed
his first 173-member parliament in February 1971,” which he named the Syrian
“People’s Assembly,” according to Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom;
and “the following year saw the formation of” Syria’s “Progressive National
Front (PNF) linking the Baath Party and 5 others” Syrian “parties deemed to be
`progressive’ and `patriotic,’” according to the same book. In 1972, for
example, the Syrian Communist Party [SCP] became part of the PNF, two SCP
leaders were among the PNF’s central leadership and the Syrian government posts
of minister of state and minister of communications under the Baath regime were
soon held by SCP members.
The May 1972 formation of Syria’s Progressive National Front
thus linked the Baath Party and Baath regime with various leftist and
nationalist Syrian political parties during the 1970s. But on Jan. 31, 1973 the
members of the Syrian “People’s Assembly” parliament that Hafez Assad had
appointed in February 1971 adopted a Syrian Constitution which constitutionally
guaranteed the leading role of the Baath Party in Syrian political life; and on
Mar. 12, 1973, this new Syrian Constitution was “overwhelmingly approved by a
national referendum,” according to Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom.
Yet, according to an essay by Hans Gunter Lobmeyer, titled
“The Syrian Opposition at the End of Assad Era,” that appeared in the 1994 book
Contemporary
Syria, “almost all the” Syrian “leftists who had not joined the
National Patriotic Front openly rejected Assad’s permanent constitution” in
1973 “because of its deeply undemocratic character” and “a great part of the
secular opposition” to Assad’s Baath regime “also turned into an anti-system
force in 1973.”
But according to Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom,
Syria’s “1973 Constitution stipulates that 51 percent of parliamentary deputies
must be workers and peasants;” and under Article 28 of Syria’s 1973
Constitution, at least theoretically, “no one shall be kept under surveillance
or detained except in accordance with the law,” “no one shall be tortured
physically or mentally or be treated in a humiliating way” and “the law defines
the punishment of whoever commits such an act.” In addition, at least
theoretically, according to Article 38 of Syria’s 1973 Constitution:
“Every citizen has the right to freely and openly express
his views in words, in writing, and through all the other means of expression.
He also has the right to participate in supervised and constructive criticism
in a manner that will safeguard the soundness of the domestic and nationalist
structure and will strengthen the socialist system. The state guarantees the
freedom of the press, printing, and publication in accordance with the laws.”
And, at least theoretically, according to Article 39 of
Syria’s 1973 Constitution, “the citizens have the right to meet and to
demonstrate peacefully within the principles of the Constitution,” although
“the law regulates the exercise of this right.”
In 1973, according to The Palestine Book Project’s 1977
book, Our Roots Are Still Alive, Hafez Assad’s Baath regime
apparently also felt itself “under strong” domestic “pressure to recover the
occupied Golan Heights” territory of Syria that the Israeli military had first
occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. So Assad held meetings with
then-Egyptian government leader Anwar Sadat during 1973 to make “final plans
for a limited war against Israel on two fronts,” according to the same book. And during October 1973, according to Our
Roots Are Still Alive, the following events happened:
“On Oct. 6, 1973, Egyptian troops launched a massive
surprise assault across the Sue Canal, and Syrian tanks and soldiers stormed
into the Golan Heights. Well-trained and well-equipped Arab soldiers drove back
the Israeli occupiers in the initial fighting…Israel suffered thousands of
casualties and lost large numbers of planes and tanks. As the fighting
continued, Israel attacked the Syrian capital of Damascus. To punish the
Syrians, Zionist leaders decided to reduce much of the Syrian economy to
rubble. The Israeli air force bombed ports, factories, power plants and oil
refineries throughout the country and government buildings in the capital.
These attacks killed many civilians. As Israeli troops began to drive the
Syrians back towards Damascus, the government formed popular militias to defend
the city…On October 22 [1973], the United States and the Soviet Union pushed a
cease-fire through the UN Security Council. Syria and Egypt accepted it
quickly, and U.S. pressure eventually convinced the reluctant Israelis to agree
to it...”
And between 3,000 and 3,500 Syrian soldiers were estimated
to have also been killed by the Israeli military during the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War.
(end of part 19)
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